Not yet assessed
Review the original instructions and requested permissions before installing.
No security review is available for this catalog entry yet.
Runs AWS Resilience Hub v2 failure mode assessments and helps interpret, prioritize, and resolve findings.
Runs and interprets AWS Resilience Hub v2 failure mode assessments. Covers starting assessments, understanding findings (severity, categories, recommendations), triaging by achievability, working with AI-generated service functions, and resolving findings. Applies when the user wants to run an assessment, review findings, or understand failure modes, or has a specific finding and asks how to resolve, remediate, or fix it. Does not apply to initial setup (use resilience-hub-getting-started) or FIS experiments.
Review the original instructions and requested permissions before installing.
No security review is available for this catalog entry yet.
How clearly the skill guides your agent, how complete its workflow is, and how you can check the outcome.
No quality assessment is available for this catalog entry yet.
Original instructions from the publisher’s SKILL.md
# Failure Mode Assessment ## Overview Domain expertise for running Resilience Hub v2 failure mode assessments, interpreting findings, triaging by severity and achievability, and driving remediation. > The AWS MCP server is recommended for executing this skill's AWS API calls, but it is not required — all operations also work with the AWS CLI directly. ## Guardrail — where this skill's own files live (MCP vs local install) Before reading a reference file, determine how this skill was loaded: - **Loaded via the AWS MCP `retrieve_skill` tool:** the skill's reference files are not on the local filesystem. Fetch each one through `retrieve_skill` with the `file` parameter (e.g. `file="references/assessment-workflow.md"`) — do NOT `file_read` these paths locally or search the filesystem for them. - **Installed locally** (e.g. `.kiro/skills/resilience-hub-failure-mode-assessment/` or `~/.claude/skills/resilience-hub-failure-mode-assessment/`): read reference files from the local skill directory using the relative paths shown here. This applies only to the skill's own reference files; always read and write user or session data in the working directory, never through `retrieve_skill`. ## Run and interpret assessments To run assessments and triage findings, follow the procedure exactly. See [references/assessment-workflow.md](references/assessment-workflow.md). ## Troubleshooting ### Assessment fails with INVALID_PERMISSIONS The service's permission model (invokerRoleName / crossAccountRoles) doesn't have access to the resources. Verify the invoker role (and any cross-account roles) can describe resources in all configured regions. ### Too many findings — where to start? Prioritize by finding severity, highest first (HIGH, then MEDIUM, then LOW). For HIGH-severity findings, check the service's achievability for the relevant policy component (from `get-service` / `list-failure-mode-assessments`): NOT_ACHIEVABLE means the architecture must change before testing; ACHIEVABLE means validate the fix with an FIS experiment. MEDIUM findings: plan remediation this sprint; LOW findings: track but don't block (see the priority matrix in [references/assessment-workflow.md](references/assessment-workflow.md) Step 5). ### AI-generated service functions are wrong Update them: `aws resiliencehubv2 update-service-function` to rename or change criticality (there is no service-function "type" parameter). Reassign resources by calling `create-service-function-resources` with the desired resource set (see [references/assessment-workflow.md](references/assessment-workflow.md) for the service-function operations). ## Security Considerations - **Least privilege:** the invoker role should be scoped to read-only discovery of only the resource types in the service's input sources; avoid granting access beyond what assessment needs. - **Encryption & access control:** recommend that S3 buckets used for report output have server-side encryption (SSE-S3 or SSE-KMS) and block public access — assessment reports can contain sensitive architectural detail. If a bucket policy grants the Resilience Hub service principal write access, scope it with `aws:SourceArn` / `aws:SourceAccount` condition keys to prevent confused-deputy writes. - **Further reading:** see [Security in AWS Resilience Hub](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/resilience-hub/latest/userguide/security.html) and the [AWS Well-Architected Security Pillar](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/wellarchitected/latest/security-pillar/welcome.html) for securing assessment outputs and IAM configurations.